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TAX RELIEF FOR PROFESSIONAL
SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code provides: "[T]he term "corpora-
tion" includes associations, joint stock companies and insurance
companies."1  This definition extends the advantages and disad-
vantages of corporate income tax law to business forms other than
true corporations. Corporate tax status, for reasons hereinafter
discussed, is particularly attractive to professional service organi-
zations. Since many states prohibit the corporate practice of law
and medicine, professional service organizations have most often
attempted to obtain corporate tax status by qualifying as "associa-
tions. ' '2 After examining the advantages and disadvantages of
corporate status and comparing the tax alternative available upon
failure to qualify as a corporation, this Comment will trace the
definition of "association" as originally formulated and sub-
sequently modified by the Treasury Department in its attempt to
exclude professional service organizations. Emphasis will be given
to recent district court cases which seem to thwart that attempt.
INCIDENTS OF CORPORATE STATUS
The quest by professional service organizations for corporate
tax treatment can be better understood after examining the stakes
involved. The major tax disadvantage of corporate status is the
so-called "double taxation." Income is taxed both to the corpora-
tion as earned and to the shareholder as distributed. An important
advantage of corporate status is the availability of the profit-
sharing and pension plans described in the Internal Revenue Code.8
Since these profit-sharing and pension plans are limited to "em-
ployees,' 4 a person must be the member of a business organization
that can given him employee status in order to utilize them, Self-
employed persons and members of a partnership are not "employ-
ees" as are persons who work for a corporation.
Corporate status is particularly attractive for professional serv-
ice organizations. They can substantially avoid double taxation by
1. INT. REv. CODE of 1954 § 7701(a) (3) [hereinafter cited as "IRC"].
2. "Association" is defined as Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (a), T.D. 6797,
1965-1 CUM. BULL. 553 as an organization which possesses a majority of
corporate characteristics. This will be discussed in detail infra.
3. IRC §§ 401-07.
4. IRC § 401(a).
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withdrawing corporate earnings as salaries, which are deductible by
the corporation as a business expense as long as they are reason-
able.5 Thus, the only tax imposed is at the shareholder level.
With the double taxation disadvantage minimized, the members of
a "corporate" professional service organization can reap full benefit
from the employee profit-sharing and pension plans.
Under a combined qualified profit-sharing and pension plan,
an employer can place a maximum of twenty-five per cent of the
compensation paid to an employee in the taxable year into retire-
ment benefits for that employee and still deduct that amount as
part of the employee's salary.6 However, receipt of these funds
by the employee is considered postponed and they are not taxed to
him until actually distributed or made available to him.7 Thus,
the employee can withdraw the funds upon retirement, taking
advantage of his presumably lower tax rate and double personal
exemptions. In addition, the eventual distribution of these funds
will receive capital gains treatment if the total distributions pay-
able are made within one year and are made on account of the
employee's death, retirement or other separation from the service
of the employer.8 The tax savings involved can be substantial. A
high income bracket employee can have twenty-five per cent of
each year's compensation set aside and withdraw it upon retire-
ment, either in periodic payments at a much lower tax rate or in
a lump sum at capital gains rates. Also, these qualified profit-
sharing and pension plans receive favorable federal estate and gift
tax treatment. If the employee dies without withdrawing the funds,
any payment receivable by a beneficiary under the qualified plan
is generally excluded from the employee-decedent's gross estate.9
The appointment by the employee of a beneficiary to receive
payments under the qualified plan after the employee's death is
not considered a transfer by the employee for federal gift tax
purposes.'0
Until recently, self-employed persons and members of part-
nerships, not being "employees," were denied these retirement
benefits. In 1962, Congress passed the Self-Employed Individuals
Tax Retirement Act,'1 commonly known as the Keogh Plan, which
5. IRC § 162(a) (1).
6. IRC § 404(a).
7. IRC § 402(a) (1).
8. IRC § 402(a) (2).
9. IRC § 2039(c).
10. IRC § 2517.
11. Pub. L. No. 87-792, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Oct. 10, 1962). The pro-
visions of the Keogh Plan have been codified in the Internal Revenue Code
grants limited retirement benefits to non-employees. But this con-
cession fell far short of the qualified retirement benefit plans avail-
able to employees. The Keogh Plan has a maximum allowable
contribution of ten per cent of the person's income or $2,500,
whichever is the lesser amount.12 This compares poorly with the
twenty-five per cent maximum under the employee plans which
have no dollar amount limitation. If the ten per cent or $2,500
maximum is exceeded, the contributions made on behalf of a per-
son are thrown back into his gross income for that year.13 An-
other limitation in the Keogh Plan is that only fifty per cent of the
maximum allowable contribution is deductible from current in-
come. 14 The maximum benefit to be derived from this plan is
thus limited to $1,250 per year (fifty per cent of the $2,500 maximum
allowable contribution). Again, this limitation has no counterpart
in the employee plans. Also, funds contributed under the Keogh
Plan can only be distributed while the distributee is between the
ages of fifty-nine and one-half years1" and seventy and one-half
years16 or the distributee will be penalized.1 7 There is no com-
parable age limitation in the employee plans. The Keogh Plan
does not grant capital gains treatment for lump sum distributions
as do the employee plans. Finally, unlike the employee plans, the
Keogh Plan does not qualify for favorable estate and gift tax treat-
ment.
If a professional service organization can achieve corporate
status, its members can avail themselves of the qualified profit-
sharing and pension plans. If not, its members are left with the
severely limited Keogh Plan. With these benefits at stake, the
battle by professional service organizations for association status
is understandable.
HISTORY
Since many states prohibit as a matter of public policy the
corporate practice of law and medicine; professional service or-
ganizations have most often sought to obtain corporate status by
qualifying as an association as that term is used in the Internal
Revenue Code definition of a corporation."8 Association was de-
fined in Morrissey v. Commissioner0 and subsequent income tax
regulations2 0 as an organization which possesses more corporate
along with the other profit-sharing and pension plan sections. See IRC §
401-05.
12. IRC § 401(e).
13. IRC § 401(e).
14. IRC § 404(a)(10).
15. IRC § 401(d) (4) (B).
16. IRC § 401(a) (9).
17. IRC § 72(M).
18. IRC § 7701(a) (3).
19. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
20. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (a), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 CuM. BuLL. 553.
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than non-corporate characteristics. The characteristics of a corpo-
ration are associates, an objective to carry on business and divide
the gains therefrom, continuity of life, centralization of manage-
ment, liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property,
and free transferability of interests.21 One year after Morrissey,
in Pelton v. Commissioner,22 an unincorporated medical group was
treated as an association. In that case, the commissioner was
arguing for association status and the medical group was seeking
to avoid it. But from this case on, the Internal Revenue Service
has generally opposed association status for professional service
organizations.
United States v. Kitner23 was a landmark case decided in 1954.
In that case an unincorporated group of doctors was seeking asso-
ciation status and its accompanying retirement benefits. Since, at
this time, few states had provisions for professional corporations
or associations, the IRS argued that the state labels attached to
these organizations should be dispositive. The court, however,
reasoned that federal standards should be applied to promote uni-
formity in the income tax law. Thus, in Kitner and a subsequent
case, 24 professional service organizations were granted association
status since they possessed more corporate than non-corporate
characteristics.
In response to Kitner, the so-called "Kitner" regulations
2
were promulgated in 1960 providing that although federal stand-
ards must be met for association status, state law determines
whether the organization does in fact possess these federally de-
fined corporate characteristics. 26 This was a reasonably safe po-
sition for the IRS to take. At that time few states permitted
professional service organizations to form anything but partner-
ships and limited partnerships which, of course, did not have the
legal attributes under state law to satisfy the federally defined
corporate characteristics.
21. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1965). This regulation provides that
those characteristics common to both corporations and the organization in
question are immaterial in determining whether that organization possesses
a majority of corporate characteristics. Since associates and an objective to
carry on a business for a profit are common to both partnerships and
corporations, only the remaining four characteristics are material in deter-
mining whether a professional service organization qualifies as an asso-
ciation.
22. 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
23. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir, 1954).
24. Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
25. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 T.D. 6503, 1960-2 CUM. BULL. 409.
26. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960).
The Treasury Department's reliance upon the legal relation-
ship established by local law backfired when many states, sensitive
to the plight of the professional service organizations, passed acts
permitting the formation of professional service corporations and
associations. 27  State law granted these new entities enough cor-
porate characteristics to qualify them for association status under
the Internal Revenue Code.
28
The Treasury Department responded this time by amending
the "Kitner" regulations in 1965.29 The new regulations were
specifically directed at professional service organizations and ap-
plied to incorporated as well as unincorporated organizations.
Even if a professional service organization was organized as an
ordinary business corporation under state law, it still could not
get corporate tax treatment unless it had a majority of corporate
characteristics." While local law still determined the legal attri-
butes of the organization, these attributes had to satisfy a stiffer
federal definition of limited liability, centralization of management,
free transferability of interests, and continuity of life than did
other business organizations."' These more stringent corporate
characteristics were:
(1) Continuity of life-In an ordinary business corporation,
the right of a shareholder to share in the profits is not dependent
upon participation in their production. But generally, professional
service organizations require an employment relationship in order
to share in profits. Thus, if state law or professional ethics re-
quire this employment relationship, a member of his estate must
dispose of his interest when the employment relationship ceases.
Under these circumstances, the continuing existence of the organ-
ization depends upon the agreement of the remaining members to
purchase the departed member's interest or to employ his proposed
successor. This is essentially different from the continuity of life
possessed by an ordinary business corporation. Consequently, such
a professional service organization lacks continuity of life.82
(2) Centralization of management-Even though a measure
of central control may exist in a professional service organization,
if the members retain traditional autonomy with respect to pro-
27. For a comprehensive compilation of the state acts see Snyder and
Weckstein, Quasi-Corporations, Quasi-Employees and Quasi-Tax Relief
for Professional Persons, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 613, 656-58, nn.148-54 (1963).
28. In 1961 Pennsylvania passed the Professional Association Act, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 12601-19 (1967). That statute seems to grant all of the
corporate characteristics as defined in the 1960 "Kitner" regulations except
perhaps limited liability. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 12617 (1967).
29. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1965).
30. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1) (1) (1965).
31. Only four of the six corporate characteristics are relevant here
since associates and an objective to carry on a business for a profit are
common to both partnerships and true business corporations. See note 21
supra.
32. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (2) (1965).
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fessional decisions and the traditional responsibility of a profes-
sional person to a client or patient, such an organization does not
possess centralization of management 8
(3) Limited liability-A professional service organization
possessed limited liability only if the personal liability of its mem-
bers is no greater than that of shareholder-employees of an ordi-
nary business corporation.
4
(4) Free transferability of interests-If a professional service
organization requires an employment relationship in order to
share in profits, free transferability of interest exists only if a
member may, without the consent of the other members, transfer
both the right to share in profits and the right to an employment
relationship 5
The professional association statutes which had been enacted
by the states sufficiently limited professional organizations so that
they were unable to meet these more stringent criteria for corpor-
ate tax status.3 6 If the 1965 amendment of the "Kitner" regulations
was strictly enforced by the courts, the hopes of professional serv-
ice organizations for corporate tax status would be dashed. How-
ever, judicial reaction to the amendment has been hostile. The
remainder of this Comment will consider the recent district court
cases which strike down that amendment.
JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE FOR PROFESSIONAL GROUPS
In Empey v. United States,7 a group of lawyers incorporated
under Colorado law88 brought an action in the district court for an
income tax refund. They had paid their income tax as a partner-
ship and were now claiming corporate tax status. The IRS,
proceeding under the amended "Kitner" regulations, argued that
because of the nature of the relationship between doctor and
patient and lawyer and client, professional service organizations
could not be taxed as corporations even if incorporated under
33. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (3) (1965).
34. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h)(4) (1965).
35. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (5) (i) 1965).
36. Pennsylvania's Professional Association Act, for example, does not
confer centralized management or limited liability as defined in the 1965
amendment to the "Kitner" regulations. Thus, organizations operating
thereunder would have, at the most, only two of the four corporate char-
acteristics and would lack the requisite majority. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
12606 and § 12617 (1967).
37. 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 967) aff'd, 406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1968).
38. The Supreme Court of Colorado, adopted a rule premitting lawyers
to incorporate. COLO. Sup. CT. R. 265.
state law.89 Regardless of whether they are incorporated under
state law, professional service organizations must still meet the
stringent corporate criteria of the amended "Kitner" regulations
to obtain corporate tax status. The court rejected this argument
and held that the attempt to tax an incorporated entity as a
partnership was invalid as inconsistent with the Internal Revenue
Code and the judicial interpretation thereof.40 The Internal Rev-
enue Code defines a partnership as ". . . a syndicate, group, pool,
joint venture or other unincorporated organization through or by
means of which any business . . is carried on. .... "41 The court
said that this reference to unincorporated organizations necessarily
excluded incorporated organizations. 42 Also, the contention of the
IRS was inconsistent with the judicial interpretation of the Internal
Revenue Code which had held that professional service organi-
zations could be treated as corporations for tax purposes. 4 The
court further strengthened its position by noting that Congress had
taken no legislative action to repudiate this judicial construction.
44
The court concluded that the invalidity of the regulations entitled
the taxpayer to corporate status and the refund was granted.
Although Empey held the 1965 amendment to the "Kitner"
regulations (hereinafter regulation (h)) invalid as to incorporated
professional service organizations, it did not discuss whether those
more stringent corporate criteria were valid as to professional serv-
ice organizations not incorporated under state law. The court in
Empey assumed arguendo that the regulations were valid as to
incorporated groups, but then stated that the group in question
would still qualify for corporate tax treatment since it possessed a
majority of corporate characteristics. 45  It is not clear, how-
ever, whether this result was reached under the more stringent
standards of regulation (h) or the ordinary standards that apply
to all other business organizations (hereinafter regulation (a)-
(g)).
In O'Neill v. United States,46 the district court again held that
the Internal Revenue Code definition of partnership necessarily
excluded the medical group in question since it was validly in-
corporated under state law. Although the statute under which
this medical group was organized was called the Ohio Professional
Association Act,47 the purpose of that act was to permit professional
39. 272 F. Supp. at 852.
40. Id. at 853.
41. IRC § 7701(a) (2).
42. 272 F. Supp. at 853.
43. United States v. Kitner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954); Pelton v.
Comm'r, 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936); Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp.
360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
44. 272 F. Supp. at 853.
45. Id. at 854.
46. 281 F. Supp. 359 (N.D. Ohio 1968).
47. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1785 (Baldwin Supp. 1966).
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service organizations to incorporate. 4 It incorporated by refer-
ence the whole body of Ohio business corporation law. 4 The court
was unable to find any material difference between professional
service associations and ordinary business corporations other than
the fact that only licensed doctors could be shareholders and serv-
ices could be rendered only by licensed doctors.50 The court there-
fore concluded that the medical group should be regarded as a
corporation under Ohio law."' As a corporation, it was necessarily
excluded from the Internal Revenue Code definition of partner-
ship and any attempt to tax it as such must fail.
Once again in O'Neill, the organization in question was incor-
porated under state law and the court did not discuss the validity
of regulation (h) as applied to unincorporated professional service
organizations.
In Kurzner v. United States,52 that question was apparently
answered, at least in dicta. Again, the medical group in question
was validly incorporated pursuant to the Florida Professional Serv-
ice Corporation Act.53 The court gave two grounds for granting
this organization corporate tax status. First, since it did not fall
under the Internal Revenue Code definition of partnership, it
could not be taxed as such.54 Second, the court moved to consider
the corporate criteria set forth in regulation (h):
It cannot be doubted that except for the most unusual
circumstances, these criteria preclude all professional serv-
ice organizations from achieving corporate tax status. One
needs only compare section 301.7701-2 (h) with sections
301.7701-2 (a) - (g) to perceive this phenomenon. It at once
becomes apparent that a dual set of criteria exists. One set
is for the non-professional organization. The other and
much stricter set of criteria is for the professional service
organization. There is no support for this discrimination
either in the cases or elsewhere. There is no factual or legal
characteristic which would justify different tax treatment
of closely held professional service organizations, on the one
hand, and closely held non-professional service organiza-
tions on the other hand.55
Thus, the court seemed to strike down regulation (h) as it
applies to either incorporated or unincorporated professional
48. 281 F. Supp. at 361.
49. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1785.08 (Baldwin Supp. 1966).
50. 281 F. Supp. at 362,
51. Id.
52. 286 F. Supp. 839 (S.D. Fla. 1968).
53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 621 (Supp. 1969).
54. 286 F. Supp. at 843.
55. Id. at 844.
groups. An unincorporated professional group, therefore, need
only possess the more leniently defined corporate characteristics of
regulations (a)-(g). The professional group in Kurzner would
not have possessed a majority of corporate characteristics under
regulation (h) since its shareholders were each liable for their
own negligent acts. Further, the stock was transferable only to
another licensed physician and only with the consent of the major-
ity of the other stockholders. But the court pointed out that the
liability of the shareholders was sharply limited to their own acts.
This differs only slightly from the liability of a shareholder in any
other corporation.5" Also, the limitation on transferability did not
affect the ". . . ability to transfer interests without disturbing
the continuity of the enterprise and the ability to issue shares to
large numbers of participants. . . . It is the latter factor and not
the presence or absence of limitations on transferability per se
that is important." 57 The court concluded that the above attributes
were sufficient to satisfy the corporate criteria of regulations (a)-
(g) and used this as the second grounds for granting corporate
tax status to the medical group.
This second ground received further support in Holder v.
United States. 8 That case involved a group of doctors organized
under the Georgia Professional Associations Act.59 Holder did not
consider whether the organization was incorporated under Georgia
law. It simply examined the attributes given that organization un-
der Georgia law and concluded that those attributes satisfied the
four basic criteria of corporate status. The court recognized that the
stringent provisions of regulation (h) applied only to professional
service organizations and that every other type of organization
was to be judged by the more lenient criteria of regulations (a)-
(g). Holder declared this stricter criteria for professional service
organizations discriminatory and invalid. 0 Professional service
organizations, like all other organizations, are to be measured
against the definitions of limited lability, centralized manage-
ment, transferability of interests, and continuity of life found in
regulations (a) -(g).61 The medical organization in Holder possessed
all four of these characteristics and was granted corporate tax
treatment.
2
Thus, it seems that even an unincorporated professional serv-
ice organization can be taxed as a corporation if it possesses a
majority of the corporate characteristics as defined in regulations
(a)-(g). Also, although the limitations placed on professional
56. Id. at 845.
57. Id.
58. 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga, 1968).
59. GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 84-4301-1-18 (Supp. 1966).
60. 289 F. Supp. at 165.




service organizations by many states would have precluded cor-
porate status under regulation (h), those limitations will not pre-
vent the organization from achieving corporate status under regu-
lations (a)-(g). The above four district court cases63 have appar-
ently ended the long history of discrimination by the Internal
Revenue Service against professional service organizations. Ab-
sent future congressional action, professional service organizations
should now have the same opportunity to take advantage of the
benefits of corporate income tax law as any other business or-
ganization.
TimoTHY L. MCNICKLE
63. The validity of regulation (h) was also questioned in St. Louis
Park Medical Center v. Lethert, 286 F. Supp. 271 (D. Minn. 1968), but the
issue was not decided. The taxpayer requested a declaratory judgment,
which the court lacked the power to grant, and, in the alternative, a pre-
liminary injunction to prevent the assessment of the tax. Since there was
no irreparable harm threatened, the injunction was also denied. The
taxpayer was left to the remedy of an action for a refund. The same issue
was also raised but not decided in Hill & Thomas Co. v. United States, 392
F.2d 204 (6th Cir. 1968). In that case the taxpayer's suit was dismissed as
moot since the Commissioner tendered refund of the entire tax paid.
